Refereed Publications
Public Goods, Social Alternatives, and the Lindahl-VCG Relationship (with D. Delacretaz and C. Mezzetti), Journal of Economic Theory (conditionally accepted)
The matching benefits of market thickness (with E. Muir), Games and Economic Behavior (forthcoming)
Market power, randomization and regulation (with E. Muir), International Journal of Industrial Organization, 96, 2024: Article 103081
Efficient consignment auctions (with B. Liu and L. Marx), Review of Economics and Statistics (forthcoming).
Coordination in the Fight Against Collusion (with E. Iossa, L. Marx and P. Rey), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 16(1), 2024: 224-261
Asymptotically optimal prior-free asset market mechanisms (with L. Marx), Games and Economic Behavior, 137, 2023: 68-90
Bilateral trade with multi-unit demand and supply (with L. Marx) Management Science, 69(2), 2022: 1146-1165
When Walras Meets Vickrey (with D. Delacretaz and C. Mezzetti), Theoretical Economics, 17(4), 2022: 1803-1845
To sell public or private goods (with L. Marx) Review of Economic Design, 26(3), 2022:385-415
Optimal market thickness (with E. Muir and P. Taylor) Journal of Economic Theory, 200, 2022: Article 105383
Incomplete Information Bargaining with Applications to Mergers, Investment, and Vertical Integration (with L. Marx) American Economic Review, 112(2), 2022: 616-49 Appendix
Monopoly pricing, optimal randomization and resale (with E. Muir), Journal of Political Economy, 130(3), 2022: 566-635
Coordinated Effects in Merger Review (with L. Marx), Journal of Law & Economics, 64(4), 2021: 705-744.
Winner of Jerry S. Cohen Award for Best Antitrust Article of 2021 on Coordinated Effects
Road to recovery: Managing an epidemic (with E. Muir), in press, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 93, 2021: Article 102482
A Dominant Strategy, Double Clock Auctions with Estimation-Based Tatonnement (with C. Mezzetti), Theoretical Economics, 16(3), 2021: 943-978
Digital Monopolies: Privacy Protection or Price Regulation? (L. Marx), International Journal of Industrial Organization, 71, 2020, Article 102623
Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions (with L. Marx), Journal of Economic Theory (May 2020)
A Dominant-Strategy Asset Market Mechanism (with L. Marx), Games and Economic Behavior, 120, 2020: 1-15 (lead article)
Entry-Deterring Agency (with A. Niedermayer), Games and Economic Behavior, 119, 2020: 172-188
Merger Review with Intermediate Buyer Power (with L. Marx), International Journal of Industrial Organization, 67, 2019, Article 102531
Merger Review for Markets with Buyer Power (with L. Marx), Journal of Political Economy, 127, 2019: 2967-3017
Mix-and-Match Divestitures and Merger Harm (with Leslie Marx), Japanese Economic Review 70 (3), 2019: 346-366
The deficit on each trade in a Vickrey double auction is at least as large as the Walrasian price gap (with C. Mezzetti), Journal of Mathematical Economics 84, 2019: 101-106
Optimal Structure and Dissolution of Partnerships (with C. Wasser), Theoretical Economics 14(3), 2019: 1063-1114
Make and Buy: Outsourcing, Vertical Integration, and Cost Reduction (with M. Riordan), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 11(1), 2019: 105-23
Two-Sided Allocation Problems, Decomposability and the Impossibility of Efficient Trade (with D. Delacretaz, L. Marx, T. Wilkening), Journal of Economic Theory: 179, 2019: 416-454
Auctions with Bid Credits and Resale (with L. Marx), International Journal of Industrial Organization: 55, 2017: 58-90
Club Good Intermediaries (with L. Marx), International Journal of Industrial Organization: 50, 2017: 430-459
A general noncentral hypergeometric distribution (with E. Muir and P. Taylor), Communications in Statistics – Theory and Methods, 46(9), 2017: 4579-4598
A long way coming: Designing centralized markets with privately informed buyers and sellers (with L. Marx and T. Wilkening), Journal of Economic Literature 53 (4), 2015: 847-97 (lead article)
An Oligopoly Model for Analyzing and Evaluating (Re)-Assingments of Spectrum Licenses (with L. Marx), Review of Industrial Organization: 45(3), 2014: 245 – 273
Market Structure and the Competitive Effects of Vertical Integration (with M. Reisinger), RAND Journal of Economics: 45(3), 2014: 471 – 494 (lead article)
Persuasion, binary choice, and the costs of dishonesty (with R. Hodler and D. Rohner) Economics Letters 124 (2), 2014: 195 – 198
Rock-Scissors-Paper and evolutionarily stable strategies, Economics Letters, Volume 118, 2013: 473-474
Sequential Location Games, web appendix (with G. Muehlheusser), RAND Journal of Economics, Volume 42 (4), 2011: 639-663
Chain Stores, Consumer Mobility, and Market Structure (with Y. Schneider), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Volume 167 (2), 2011: 236-246
Inefficient policies and incumbency advantage, Journal of Public Economics, Volume 94, 2010: 761-767 (with R. Hodler and D. Rohner)
The ABC of complementary products mergers (with S. Anderson and Y. Schneider), Economics Letters, Volume 106, 2010: 212-215
Vertical mergers that eliminate double markups are procompetitive, Economic Bulletin, Volume 4, Number 22, 2008: 1-6
On Cheating, Doping and Whistleblowing (with A. Berentsen and E. Bruegger), European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 24(2), 2008: 415-436
Learning, public good provision, and the information trap (with A. Berentsen and E. Bruegger), Journal of Public Economics, Volume 92, Issues 5-6, June 2008: 998-1010
Global and Local Players in a Model of Spatial Competition (with G. Muehlheusser), Economics Letters, Volume 98, Number 1, 2008: 100-106
Market Making Oligopoly, Journal of Industrial Economics , Volume L VI, Number 2, 2008: 263-289
Horizontally Differentiated Market Makers, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Volume 16, Number 4, Winter 2007: 793-825
Articles in books and other publications
Double Markups, Information, and Vertical Mergers (with L. Marx), Antitrust Bulletin, 67(3).
Winner of the Jerry S. Cohen Award for Best Antitrust Article of 2022 on Vertical Mergers
The Possibility of Social-Surplus-Reducing Vertical Mergers (with L. Marx), CPI Antitrust Chronicle, October 2020: 15.
Location Games, in: Spatial Economics Volume I, edited by S. Colombo, Springer International, Singapore, 2020. Ch. 5: 111-128
Economics and the efficient allocation of spectrum licenses (with L. Marx), in: Mechanisms and Games for Dynamic Spectrum Access, edited by T. Alpcan, H. Boche, M.L. Honig, and H.V. Poor, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014: 553-578
Matching and Economic Design (with G. Artemov and S. Feldmann), Australian Economic Review, 45 (1), 2012: 134-141.
Auctions and Economic Design, (with T. Wilkening), Australian Economic Review, 44 (3), 2011: 347-54.
Working papers
All-receive procurement auctions (with L. Marx and P. Rey)
Could the Cold War have been avoided?
The Biggar DWL (with B. Liu)
Optimal Hotelling Auctions (with E. Muir)
Efficient trade and ownership on networks (with L. Marx)
Mergers, remedies, and incomplete information (with L. Marx)
Optimal labor procurement under minimum wages and monopsony power (with E. Muir)
Percentage Fees in Thin Markets: An Optimal Pricing Perspective (with A. Niedermayer)
An Optimal Pricing Theory of Transaction Fees in Thin Markets (with A. Niedermayer)
Location choice and information transmission
Monotonicity, non-participation, and directed search equilibria (with J. Bland)
Multi-Party Competition under Proportional Representation
Some people never learn, rationally (with A. McLennan)
Commentary
The economics of COVID-19, Pursuit, 22 July 2020 (with E. Muir)
A national ventilator exchange could address critical shortages, The Hill, 27 March 2020 (with L. Marx)